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Abstract
This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy aﬀects policy
outcomes and how it changes the legislature’s willingness to delegate decision-making
authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account
for interest group inﬂuence during the implementation stage of policy and apply it
to diﬀerent institutional structures of government. The paper addresses the following
questions: First, how does the decision to delegate change when the bureaucratic agent
is subject to external inﬂuence? What cost does this inﬂuence impose on the legislative
principal? Finally, how susceptible are policy choices to bureaucratic lobbying under
diﬀerent government structures? In answering these questions, the paper seeks to pro-
vide a comparative theory of lobbying and to explain the diﬀerent patterns of interest
group activity across political systems.
1We would like to thank Keith Krehbiel, Torsten Persson, Jim Snyder, Justin Wolfers, and seminar
participants at the University of Chicago, Copenhagen Business School, Institute of International Studies
Stockholm, and Stanford Business School for valuable comments.
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1 Introduction
In any political system, a large number of policy decisions are made by bureaucratic agencies.
Delegating policy authority to the bureaucracy is not only a necessity for the legislature,
it also engenders many advantages by relying on the policy expertise of bureaucrats. The
disadvantage, of course, is that policy choices by the bureaucracy may not be the ones
the legislature would enact if it had the same information available as the bureaucrat.
Delegation is a choice variable, and the present paper analyzes how the optimal degree
of delegation is aﬀected by interest group activity at the bureaucratic level, and how the
inﬂuence of interest groups diﬀers across diﬀerent political systems.
Extensive scholarly work has recently been devoted to the tradeoﬀ between informational
advantage and loss of political control. This body of work has highlighted how optimal
delegation from the point of view of the legislature depends on the professionalism and
expertise of the bureaucracy relative to the legislature, on the ability to monitor and to
sanction bureaucratic decisions, on the political environment such as divided government
in the U.S. or the composition of the government coalition in Parliamentary systems, and
the type of agency.2 Within any given political system, the degree of delegation also tends
to vary across policy areas: bureaucrats tend to have the less discretion in tax and social
security policy than in areas such as education, foreign trade and environmental policy
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).
As a consequence of delegation, the bureaucracy, endowed with the authority to de-
termine policy within its domain, provides an important venue of interest group activity.
Interest groups participate in agency decision-making on a regular basis. In the U.S., the
administrative procedures require agencies to engage interest groups formally in the rule
making process (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1997, 1989, 1990, Moe 1990, Wright 1996).
Interest groups testify in administrative hearings, participate through notice and comment
2See Banks 1989, Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, Bawn 1995, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996, 1999, Gailmard
2002, Volden 2002, Huber and Shipan 2002.
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and use their policy- and legal expertise to intervene in agency adjudication and thereby af-
fect policy choices. In addition to the formal ways of participation, interest groups maintain
direct contacts with agencies that led in the past to a view of the interest group–agency–
legislative committee relationship as an “iron triangle” of interlocking interests. Interest
groups leverage their informational advantage to inﬂuence agency decision-making in their
favor, and concern is often raised about the “revolving door” that exists between interest
groups and bureaucratic agencies through which top-level bureaucrats stand to gain from
favorable treatment of certain groups. In the comparative context, private interests have
even cozier relationship with the bureaucracy in corporatist political systems where their
participation obtains quasi-oﬃcial character.
In contrast to the active role interest groups play during policy implementation, the
theory of delegation conceives the relationship between the legislature and the bureaucracy
almost solely as a principal–agent relationship with imperfect information between the leg-
islature and the bureaucracy, while interest groups serve primarily the role as control device
in the guise of ﬁre alarms that informs the legislature about independent bureaucratic drift.
In this paper we reintroduce interest groups lobbying at the bureaucratic level into the dele-
gation discussion and show how their activity changes predictions about optimal delegation
and the resulting policy outcomes. While this step is a straightforward extension of the
standard delegation model, we will show that it provide a new channel to explain some of
the observed variation in delegation of authority across policy areas and across diﬀerent
institutional environments. This supplements existing explanations as well as introduces
interesting comparative statics across political systems.
The ﬁrst contribution of this extension is to characterize how the eﬀect of bureaucratic
lobbying on the delegation tradeoﬀ depends on the presence, strength, and preferences of the
interest group(s). Interest group lobbying of the agency charged with implementing policy
can either increase or decrease the amount of delegated authority, depending on whether
lobbying further exacerbates the preference conﬂict between the agency and the legislature
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or whether the interest groups act as the legislature’s ally.
Consider, e.g., the policy areas of taxation and environmental protection, between which
the degree of delegation diﬀers substantially. Suppose, ﬁrst, that the design of tax policy
for a heterogenous group of agents were delegated extensively to a tax authority. We
would expect interest groups to lobby for lowering their own tax rates, while hardly any
signiﬁcant pressure would be exerted to increase taxes for any group or groups of agents.
Thus, bureaucratic lobbying would push the bureaucrat’s choice of taxes in one direction
only, making it unlikely that the legislature’s preferred policy would be implemented (unless
the agency’s own preferred tax rates exceeded that of the legislature). Everything else equal,
lobbying should thus decrease the amount of delegation to the bureaucrats. (It is worth
noting that “blame shifting” would suggest that taxes not be determined in detail by the
legislature, while the “hold up” of the agency by interest groups justiﬁes the detailed budget
legislation that is common in most legislatures.)
Next, consider an agency operating in an environment that Wilson (1980, 1989) char-
acterizes as entrepreneurial or as interest group politics, i.e., where organized interests are
opposed to the agency’s inherent mission or where they oppose each other, such as in envi-
ronmental policy or the domain of public health. Here the danger of bureaucratic lobbying
“hijacking” the agency is less warranted. Quite the opposite may be the case, as the aggre-
gate eﬀect of bureaucratic lobbying may be to align the agency’s decision more closely with
the legislature’s preferences. This implies that the legislature will be less concerned about
potential policy drift and thus increase delegation to harvest the fruits of expert knowledge
embodied in the bureaucratic administration of environmental policy. In both cases, taking
the eﬀect of lobbying on the bureaucracy’s behavior into account aﬀects the amount of
optimal delegation.
The paper’s second contribution is to analyze how the interaction between bureaucratic
lobbying and delegation is aﬀected by the structure of the larger political institution. We
contrast the eﬀect of bureaucratic lobbying in a separation of powers system with those of a
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parliamentary system. In earlier work (Bennedsen and Feldmann 2002a,b) we have shown
that the two systems provide diﬀerent incentives for lobbying in the legislative arena; in this
paper we show that the eﬀect of lobbying also diﬀers at the bureaucratic level, albeit the
results are far from clear-cut due to the complicating fact that delegation is endogenous.
In the parliamentary system, lobbying always reduces delegation since interest groups
move policy away from the legislature’s ideal policy. In a separation of powers system,
where the agency is appointed by the administration and thus need not have preferences
similar to the legislature’s, the eﬀect of lobbying is ambivalent. As the agency’s policy
preference diﬀers from the legislature’s even without lobbying, interest group inﬂuence may
move policy outcomes closer to the legislature’s most preferred outcome, in which case the
legislature optimally expands delegation to the agency. But interest groups may also draw
policy further from the legislature’s preferred outcome; in this case the opposite result holds,
and the legislature ideally delegates less.
We derive the relative impact of lobbying on the expected utility of the legislature and
on expected policy outcomes across the two systems. The impact diﬀers between the two
systems and is non-linear in agents’ ideal points. Comparing the eﬀect on the legislature’s
expected utility is relatively easy: there is a cutoﬀ point such that bureaucratic lobbying
has a greater (negative) impact on legislative utility in the parliamentary system whenever
the lobby group is not exacerbating the preference conﬂict between the bureaucrat and the
legislature.
The relative impact on expected policy is more involved. The reason is that the leg-
islature can always move the average policy closer to its preferred policy by reducing the
amount of discretion, whereby the uncertainty about policy outcomes increases. Thus, ob-
serving average policy outcomes close to the legislature’s preference does not necessarily
indicate low lobbying activity; it may equally be an indication of low delegation in reaction
to high degrees of lobbying. This suggests that observed diﬀerences in delegation across
political systems should be regarded with substantial care to the details for the incentives
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to delegate and to the political (i.e., interest group) environment.
The paper builds on and extends the now standard model of delegation as developed by
Epstein and O’Halloran (1994, 1999) in the U.S. context and adapted by Huber and Shipan
(2001, 2002) for the comparative context. Huber and Shipan (2002) provide a compre-
hensive comparative study of legislative delegation and bureaucratic discretion identifying
various factors that determine degree of delegation, but they do not consider the role of in-
terest groups. In the traditional Congressional dominance literature it is often assumed that
Congressional policy is intended to serve interest groups (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast
1987, 1989), which implies that interest groups have the ability to inﬂuence bureaucratic
decision-making ex post. One of the interest groups’ roles in this context is to feed informa-
tion back to Congress when agencies depart from their legislative mandate and disregard
the groups’ interest (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, Banks and Weingast 1992, Epstein
and O’Halloran 1995).
Interest groups inﬂuence on agency decision-making, if present, remains largely black
box in these models. An obvious way of inﬂuencing policy decisions is via the informa-
tion an interest group provides. In this paper we employ a simpler form of inﬂuence
technology that is based on simple incentive schemes oﬀered to the bureaucrat, similar
to Grossman and Helpman (1994). As mentioned above, interest groups often provide lu-
crative post-government employment opportunities for high-level bureaucrats that can be
seen as providing incentives for bureaucrats to change their manifest policy preferences. By
sidestepping the diﬃcult problem of information provision for the moment, we provide a
framework for a comparative institutional analysis of lobbying the bureaucracy. A simi-
lar approach in the comparative analysis of legislative lobbying is taken by Diermeier and
Myerson (1999), Persson (1998), and Helpman and Persson (2001).
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section extends the delegation model to include
lobbying at the bureaucratic level. Section 3 solves the model and shows the interaction
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between bureaucratic lobbying and optimal delegation. Section 4 introduces our stripped-
down version of separation-of-power and parliamentary government structures. Section 5
analyzes the relative impact of bureaucratic lobbying in these two systems and Section 6
discuss our ﬁndings. All proofs are relegated to the appendices.
2 The Model
In the basic version of the model we have three players: a legislator (L) who delegates a task
to a bureaucrat (B), and an interest group (I) that is able to inﬂuence the bureaucrat. Later
on we will also introduce an administration (A) representing the president or government
in a system of separation of powers or parliament, respectively. In these cases, A chooses
the bureaucrat.
We assume that the policy space is one-dimensional. All players have preferences over
the policy outcome, x. The policy outcome is a function of the chosen policy, p, and a
noise parameter, ω, such that x = p + ω. We assume that ω is uniformly distributed on the
interval [−r, r], with r being a measure of the ex ante uncertainty in the environment. The
politician does not know the realization of ω since this requires expert knowledge that the
bureaucrat and the interest group are assumed to possesses.
All players have single peaked preferences over policy outcomes,
UL(x) = −(x− xL)2,
UB(x, t) = −(x− xB)2 + αBt,
U I(x, t) = −(x− xI)2 − αIt,
where t is a measure of transferable utility (i.e., in the simplest case, money) that is trans-
ferred from the interest group to the agent. The transfer may be in form of an explicit
incentive contract, but may also be a more indirect contract, e.g., the promise of a better
paid future job arranged by the interest group for the publicly employed bureaucrat. αi
reﬂects the relative value the bureaucrat and the interest group place on the transferred
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resource, respectively, and thus α ≡ αB/αI is a measure of the eﬃcacy of the inﬂuence
technology.
The timing of the model is as follow:
Date 0: The agency is chosen.
Date 1: The legislator speciﬁes a reference policy, q, and a distance, d, the combination of
which reﬂects the scope of delegation. The range D = [q − d, q + d] is the window of
discretion in which the bureaucrat may implement the policy.
Date 2: The realization of the policy shock ω is revealed to the bureaucrat and the interest
group. Then, the interest group oﬀers an incentive schedule t(p), i.e., an oﬀer that
speciﬁes a utility transfer t from the interest group to the bureaucrat conditional on
the policy choice p.
Date 3: The bureaucrat chooses policy p, and payoﬀs are realized.
We assume that policy outside the window [q−d, q+d] will be struck down by the courts.
Gailmard (2002) generalizes the notion of the delegation window in that the bureaucrat can
exceed her delegated authority at some cost and faces a probability of being struck down
less than one. We adopt the simpler and more rigid notion of a ﬁxed window.
An implicit assumption in our framework is that the legislature (or later the admin-
istration) cannot make a strategic choice of bureaucratic preferences. Hence, we think
of situations where bureaucrats either are inherited from past legislature’s, or where the
bureaucrat is picked for other reasons like expert knowledge on the relevant policy areas,
previous work in the party organization of the majority party, or political loyalty. An al-
ternative but more complicated framework could allow for strategic choice of bureaucratic
preferences in a model with suﬃcient electoral uncertainty (Calvert, McCubbins, Weingast
1989, Persson and Tabellini 2000).
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3 Optimal Policy, Discretion, and Inﬂuence
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game by backward induction. The fol-
lowing lemma and corollary characterize the solution to the delegation game with lobbying.
Lemma 1. Let xˆ = x
B+αxI
1+α . The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the delegation
game with bureaucratic lobbying is as follows. The legislature chooses reference policy and
degree of discretion
q = xL
d = max
{
r − |xˆ− xL|, 0} .
Given (q, d), the interest group induces the bureaucrat to implement policy
p =

xˆ− ω if ω ≤ ω ≤ ω¯
q + d if ω < ω
q − d if ω > ω¯
where ω = (xˆ − q) − d and ω¯ = (xˆ − q) + d. The transfer oﬀered exactly compensates the
bureaucrat for the utility loss relative to the policy implemented without lobbying.
The proof is given in the appendix.
The lemma states that the bureaucrat seeks to implement a policy that yields the
outcome xˆ, provided that such policy lies within the delegation window; failing this, she
implements the closest policy possible. The group accomplishes this choice using the min-
imal transfer, so that the bureaucrat’s utility after inﬂuence equals the utility she would
have received without inﬂuence.
The legislature, anticipating this bureaucratic implementation strategy, chooses the level
of delegation so as to optimally trade oﬀ the beneﬁt from the bureaucrat’s expertise (knowl-
edge of the state of the world) and the loss from policy bias. Delegation occurs if and only if
the induced implementation bias is not too great relative to the ex ante policy uncertainty,
speciﬁcally, if |xˆ − xL| < r. The equilibrium level of delegation in Lemma 1 is analogous
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to the standard model (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). However, since the agency is be-
ing lobbied, the legislature takes into account the bureaucrat’s induced ideal point xˆ that
results from the incentive schedule. Depending on the direction of inﬂuence from the inter-
est group, the legislature may in fact grant the agency more or less discretion than in the
absence of lobbying, as summarized in the following, unsurprising corollary.
Corollary 1. a) The presence of an interest group decreases bureaucratic discretion if and
only if the interest group’s lobbying activity moves the bureaucrat’s induced ideal policy
further away from the legislature’s preferred policy, i.e., iﬀ |xˆ− xL| ≥ |xB − xL|.
b) Ceteris paribus, increasing ex ante uncertainty increases bureaucratic discretion.
Part b) of the Corollary states that the greater the ex ante uncertainty, as represented by
r, the more discretion the legislature delegates to the bureaucrat, reﬂecting the informational
rationale for delegation.
We now show that the distribution of outcomes resulting from delegation follows a two-
part distribution. From Lemma 1 we know that whenever ω ∈ [ω, ω¯], the agency chooses
p so that the outcome is x = xˆ. When ω falls outside this 2d-wide interval, the agency’s
choice is constrained by the lower (upper) bound of the discretion window if xˆ >(<) xL and
is thus p = q −(+) d. Thus, with probability mass dr the policy outcome is x = xˆ, and with
the remaining probability it varies uniformly from 2xL− xˆ to xˆ (xˆ to 2xL− xˆ), a range that
is symmetric around the legislature’s ideal point xL, having an expectation of xL. Thus,
given the uniform density f(ω) = 12r , the expected policy outcome with delegation is easy
to calculate and is
E(x) =
d
r
xˆ + (1− d
r
)xL.
If the legislature does not delegate to the agency (setting q = xL, d = 0), outcomes vary
uniformly from xL − r to xL + r, yielding an expected outcome of xL. Thus, delegation
necessarily induces bias (whenever d > 0, xˆ = xL). The beneﬁt of optimal delegation, then,
is to eliminate outcomes whose distance |x − xL| > |xˆ − xL|. Under the assumption of
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a uniform distribution of ω, the distribution of outcomes ﬁrst-order stochastically domi-
nates the distribution of outcomes without delegation from the legislature’s point of view.3
Thus, any legislature with single-peaked preferences beneﬁts from delegation and from the
bureaucrat’s expertise, even if the legislature is not risk averse.
Deﬁning Inﬂuence
Since delegation reduces the range and variance of outcomes at the cost of bias in the
expected outcome and with the eﬀect of raising the legislature’s utility, one can gauge the
degree of interest group inﬂuence by measuring its impact on the legislature’s delegation
decision and on the agency’s policy choice or, alternatively, on the degree to which policy
outcomes and the uncertainty associated with these outcomes are aﬀected. Both approaches
are, of course, interrelated and measure the extent of policy bias induced by lobbying and
how it aﬀects the legislature’s ability to rely on the expertise of the bureaucracy. In our
model, since utility functions are quadratic, mean and variance of policy outcomes are a
suﬃcient statistic for the welfare of the actors.4 We will thus focus on the second set of
measures, the impact of lobbying on expected policy outcomes and their variance.
Inﬂuencing policy outcomes. We deﬁne the lobby group’s impact on expected policy
outcomes (LIO) as the average bias induced relative to policy outcomes from delegation
when no lobbying occurs:
LIO = E(x | lobbying)− E(x | no lobbying)
=
d
r
xˆ + (1− d

r
)xL − d
n
r
xB + (1− d
n
r
)xL,
3More precisely, given optimal delegation (q, d) and a uniform distribution of ω, the distribution of the dis-
tance |x−xL| ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the distribution of |x−xL| resulting from any other degree
of delegation d˜. However, if the distribution of ω is not uniform, fosd need no longer hold. A similar point
about the eﬀect of delegation has been raised, albeit less precisely, by Bendor and Meirowitz (forthcoming).
4Speciﬁcally, for any distribution of outcomes x, EU i(x) = −E[(x− xi)2] = −[(E(x)− xi)2 + V (x)],
i = L, B, I. For utility functions other than quadratic, more information about the distribution may be
relevant and necessary.
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Figure 1: Impact of lobbying on expected outcome and delegation
where d and dn are the degrees of delegation granted to an agency that is being lobbied
or not being lobbied, respectively. From now on we normalize the legislature’s ideal point
to xL = 0 and assume without loss of generality xB ≥ 0. This simpliﬁes notation and yields
LIO =
d
r
xˆ− d
n
r
xB (1)
In the following we are often interested in the magnitude of |LIO| rather than its direction.
When xˆ and xB are not too far from xL, then lobbying moves the expected policy
outcome in the direction of the interest group’s ideal point. This eﬀect, however, is not
monotonic. Beyond some point the impact is reversed. The reason is that the expected
policy for either form of delegation (with or without lobbying) is furthest away from xL
when delegation allows for the greatest expected policy bias in exchange for a reduction of
uncertainty, as is reﬂected in the ﬁrst-order conditions for a maximum of LIO in (1),
max
xˆ
|LIO| ⇒ |xˆ| = r
2
.
Thus, if xˆ is more than r2 away from x
L, then a move of xˆ further away from B’s ideal point
actually moves the expected policy closer to xL, as less discretion is being granted to the
agency. This eﬀect is illustrated in Figure 1.
The cost of lobbying in this latter case lies not in increased inﬂuence, but in an increase of
uncertainty due to the reduction in delegation. If the agency’s induced ideal point is further
away from xL, the informational advantage of delegation for the legislature is diminished.
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Aﬀecting the legislature’s expected welfare. Let x˜ be the bureaucrat’s induced ideal
point with or without lobbying.5 As we saw above, under uniform distribution of ω and
optimal delegation (with d > 0), the policy outcome x equals x˜ with probability d/r and
continues to be uniformly distributed on the interval [−|x˜|, |x˜|] with probability 1 − d/r.
Thus, the legislature’s expected utility, or welfare, from optimal delegation and given x˜, is
W (x˜) ≡ E[UL(x) | d, x˜] = E(−(x)2 | d, x˜) = −d
r
x˜2 −
∫ |x˜|
−|x˜|
z2
2r
dz
= −x˜2(1− 23r |x˜|). (2)
d > 0 requires r > |x˜|, ⇒ 1− 23r |x˜| ≥ 13 .
Diﬀerentiating (2) with respect to the agency’s ideal point yields
∂W
∂|x˜| = −2|x˜| (1−
|x˜|
r ) < 0,
where the inequality holds due to d > 0. Thus, the legislature’s welfare is monotonically
decreasing in the distance |x˜|.
Similarly to the above impact on policy outcomes, we are interested in the lobby group’s
impact on the legislature’s welfare, LIW . Denoting the legislature’s welfare under optimal
delegation without lobbying by Wn and with lobbying by W , we have LIW = W −Wn.
Given the monotonicity of W (x˜) when delegation is strictly positive, we conclude that
bureaucratic lobbying diminishes the legislature’s welfare whenever |xˆ| > xB.
4 Delegation Under Diﬀerent Political Structures
The incentives to delegate in a system of separation of powers have amply been analyzed,
and few studies have addressed the diﬀerent incentives for a legislature to delegate across
diﬀerent institutional environments. In this section we analyze the role of interest groups
and their eﬀect on delegation in a comparative context, a subject which has not been
investigated theoretically before.
5I.e., x˜ = xˆ with lobbying and x˜ = xB without lobbying.
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Arguably, one key diﬀerence between a parliamentary system and a separation-of-powers
system is the amount of conﬂict that arises between the administration and the legislature.
In a parliamentary system the majority coalition (generally) controls the legislature and
governs the bureaucracy, hence it is likely that the preferences of the bureaucrat closely
reﬂect the preferences of the majority coalition. In a separation-of-powers system, by con-
trast, legislature and the administration are distinct and answer to diﬀerent constituencies.
Even if the control of the legislature and the government is not formally divided between
the parties, greater preference divergence may persist between the administration and the
legislature.
We model the diﬀerence in government structure by introducing an administration A
with single peaked preferences that may diﬀer from the legislatures, and denote them by
UA ≡ −(x − xA)2. To make the analysis suﬃciently straightforward, we assume that the
administration picks a bureaucrat with identical preferences to itself, i.e. xB ≡ xA. We
focus in the following on how the wedge between the preferences of the administration and
the legislature aﬀects the inﬂuence of lobby groups. We characterize the parliamentary
system by the congruence of administrative and legislative preferences, xA = xL, and the
separation of powers system by the potential conﬂict between the two, xA = xL. To simplify
notation we normalize xL = 0 and focus without loss of generality on the case xA ≥ 0.
In the parliamentary system with xB = xL, the legislature would have no need to
constrain the administration without lobbying. According to Lemma 1, full discretion is
granted and the bureaucracy chooses policy that oﬀsets any ex post shock; the outcome is
precisely the legislature’s idealpoint. With lobbying the picture looks slightly diﬀerent. The
bureaucrat’s induced idealpoint with lobbying in the parliamentary system (using subscript
p) is xˆp = x
L+αxI
1+α =
α
1+αx
I , and the legislature reduces the scope of delegation to dp =
r − |xˆp|.
In the separation of powers system without lobbying, delegation depends on the extent of
conﬂict between the legislature and the administration. The larger the conﬂict, the smaller
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the authority delegated to the bureaucracy, d = r − xA (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999).
With lobbying the bureaucrat’s induced preference (using subscript s for sep. of powers)
is xˆs = x
A+αxI
1+α , and the degree of discretion becomes ds = r − |xˆs|. Depending on the
location of the interest group, lobbying may exacerbate or attenuate the conﬂict between
the legislature’s preference and the bureaucrat’s policy choice. The bureaucrat’s induced
preference is more moderate with lobbying than without if |xˆs| < xA, which is always the
case whenever xI lies between xL and xA, and is also the case when xI is not too far to the
left of xL so as to over-compensate the A’s preference on the opposite side.6
Proposition 1. 1. In the parliamentary system, lobbying reduces delegation and moves
expected policy away from the legislature’s ideal point.
2. In a separation of powers system, lobbying increases delegation if
xI ∈
[
−2 + α
α
xA, xA
]
. (A)
3. For given xL and xA, the legislature delegates more to the bureaucracy under a
separation of powers system than under a parliamentary structure iﬀ
xI < − 1
2α
xA. (B)
Proposition 1 recaps that lobbying decreases delegation in the parliamentary system in
all cases, while in the separation of powers system lobbying may have a moderating eﬀect
on the bureaucrat’s policy choice that leads to more delegation and to a more eﬃcient use of
the bureaucrat’s expertise if the interest group’s ideal point lies in the range given by (A).
Part 3 of the proposition states that if the interest group is a suﬃcient counter-weight to
the administration’s preference (B), then the legislature delegates more to the bureaucracy
in the separation of powers system than in the parliament.
Since the legislature’s welfare is directly related to the amount of delegation that occurs
in equilibrium, we have as a corollary to Proposition 1, Parts 1 and 2, that LIWp is always
6Speciﬁcally, |xˆs| < xA if xI > − 2+αα xA for xI < 0.
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negative in the parliamentary system, whereas in the separation of powers system lobbying
may increase or decrease legislative welfare, as the sign of LIWs depends on whether |xˆs| ≶
xA, as given by (A).
5 Inﬂuence and Political Structure
In this section we examine in which political system bureaucratic lobbying yields the great-
est inﬂuence on policy. Unfortunately, comparing the two political systems in this regard is
not straightforward. The complication lies in the fact that since the degree of delegation is
endogenous to the group’s lobbying eﬀorts, the impact of lobbying is non-linear. Secondly,
the public debate about inﬂuence of interest groups focuses on their inﬂuence on (expected)
policy outcomes, whereas in the context of delegation the eﬀect of lobbying on the legisla-
ture’s ability to make use of bureaucratic expertise and thus on its expected utility may be
more pertinent.
For these reasons we will analyze the two measures of inﬂuence below. We ﬁrst present
an example that shows the non-linearity of the relationships, which should be suﬃciently
straightforward to provide an intuition for the basic comparative statics at work. Afterwards
we characterize formally the relative impact of the lobby group on expected utility and
expected outcome in the two systems.
5.1 A Simple Example
For a comparison of the eﬀect of bureaucratic lobbying we calculate the degree of delegation,
expected policy, its variance, and the legislature’s resulting expected utility in the two
political systems for diﬀerent interest group ideal points. The values are easy enough to
calculate using the results from above.7 For the sake of the example we assume xL = 0,
7Let xI be given. In the parliamentary system we then have: xBp = 0 and xˆp =
αxI
1+α
; in the separation of
powers system: xBs = x
A and xˆs =
xA+αxI
1+α
. Optimal delegation implies d = r−|xˆ|, and we get the expected
policy outcome E(x) = xˆ− sign(xˆ)xˆ2
r
. In addition, the variance of the policy outcome is V (x) = |xˆ
3|
r
( 4
3
− |xˆ|
r
).
Since the legislature’s utility function is negative quadratic and its ideal point is zero, its expected utility
EUL = − (E(x)2 + V (x)) = −xˆ2(1− 2|xˆ|
3r
).
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xA = r2 , r = 1 and α = 1, while the interest group’s ideal point varies. Table 1 illustrates
the eﬀect of lobbying in the two political systems.
Table 1: Example of the eﬀect of bureaucratic lobbying
Parliamentary System Separation of Powers
xI xˆ dp E(x) V (x) EUL xˆ ds E(x) V (x) EUL
— 0 1 0 0 0 12
1
2
1
4 .104 −.167
1
2
1
4
3
4
3
16 .017 −.052 12 12 14 .104 −.167
1 12
1
2
1
4 .104 −.167 34 14 316 .246 −.281
− 12 − 14 34 − 316 .017 −.052 0 1 0 0 0
In this example: xL = 0, xA = r
2
, r = 1, and α = 1.
First, row 1 shows the outcome of delegation without lobbying. Delegation is greater
and the expected policy more in line with the legislature’s preferences in the parliamentary
system than in the separation of powers system, due to the executive–legislative conﬂict in
the separation of powers system.
Comparing lobbying (rows 2–4) with no lobbying (row 1) in the parliamentary system
shows that lobbying, when it induces the bureaucrat’s ideal point to move further from the
legislature’s ideal point, reduces the amount of discretion granted to the legislature and
may move expected policy outcomes further from the legislature’s ideal policy.
The numbers under separation of powers illustrate however that the policy outcome does
not move monotonically with the extremeness of the interest group. In row 3 the interest
group is more extreme than in row 2, but the expected policy is closer to the legislature. In
this case the legislature’s expected utility is nonetheless lower, as it grants less discretion
to the bureaucrat. This happens whenever the bureaucrat’s induced ideal point is further
than |r/2| from the legislature’s ideal point, as we have seen above.
In the separation of powers system the interest group may move policy closer to xL and
thus increase the informational beneﬁt of the bureaucracy for the legislature if the interest
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group inﬂuence compensates (at least in part) the diﬀerences in preferences between the
legislature and the administration: In row 4, e.g., the legislature delegates completely and
obtains its most preferred outcome with lobbying, while without lobbying it only partially
delegates and also only partially beneﬁts from delegation.
Row 3 under the separation of powers system also illustrates that an interest group may
be worse oﬀ lobbying than not lobbying at all: here the expected policy is further away
from the interest group’s ideal and the variance of the outcome is greater than in row 1
without lobbying. The reason is that the presence of the lobby group induces the legislature
to delegate less. As a consequence, both legislature and interest group are worse oﬀ than
without lobbying. If the group could commit not to lobby, it would be better oﬀ. But in the
absence of such a commitment strategy, the legislature must anticipate that bureaucratic
lobbying will occur, and thus reduces (or increases) the degree of discretion accordingly.
The impact of lobbying on expected policy outcomes in this example is, of course, the
diﬀerence of expected policy with lobbying (rows 2–4) and that without lobbying (row 1).
5.2 Impact on Legislature’s Welfare
As we see from the example, the eﬀects of lobbying on expected policy outcomes and the
legislature’s welfare are non-monotonic in the interest group’s ideal point. Thus, the rela-
tionship between bureaucratic lobbying and the legislative structure is not a straightforward
one. We ﬁrst analyze the eﬀect of lobbying on the legislature’s welfare under the alternative
government structures before turning to the eﬀect on policy outcomes in the next subsection.
We deﬁne ∆LIWps ≡ LIWp−LIWs as the impact of lobbying on welfare in the parlia-
mentary system relative to the separation of powers system. We already know that lobbying
always reduces legislative welfare in the parliamentary system, while it may have a positive
or negative eﬀect under separation of powers. Thus, when if ∆LIWps is positive, it means
that lobbying has a less pernicious eﬀect on the legislature’s utility in the parliamentary
system, even though lobbying reduces utility in both systems.
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Figure 2: Ideal point ranges where lobbying reduces the legislature’s welfare more in the
parliamentary (P) or the separation of powers (S) system
To limit the permutation of cases to be covered we conﬁne our analysis to the situation
in which the ideal points of the bureaucratic agent and the interest group are suﬃciently
aligned with the legislature so that the legislature has an incentive to delegate, both with and
without lobbying. The incentive to delegate is (weakly) positive if max{|xˆp|, |xˆs|, xA} ≤ r.
With suﬃcient ex ante uncertainty this condition is always satisﬁed. The relevant range of
ideal points is, therefore, xA ∈ [0, r] and xI ∈ [−1+αα r, 1+αα r − 1αxA].
Proposition 2 characterizes the range of ideal points for which lobbying aﬀects legislative
welfare less negatively in the parliamentary system:
Proposition 2. Assume that the legislature has a (weak) incentive to delegate in each sys-
tem of government, both with and without lobbying. Then lobbying at the bureaucratic level
reduces the legislature’s welfare more in the parliamentary system than in the separation of
powers system iﬀ
xI ≤ 0 or xA ≥ r(1 + α)x
I − αxI2
(xI + r(1 + α)(α/2 + 1))
.
The bound on xA for which lobbying has a less pernicious eﬀect in the parliamentary case
is quadratic in xI and is therefore not readily interpreted. Figure 2 graphs the conditions
and depicts the range of ideal points for which the eﬀect of lobbying is less detrimental.
The outer bounds for the ﬁgure are given by the premise that there is a positive incentive
to delegate. For instance, when xI < −1+αα r the parliamentary legislature prefers not to
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leave any discretion to the bureaucrat. Similarly, if xI > 1+αα r and x
A = 0 there will be no
discretion in neither legislative structure. When xA increases the maximum xI that leaves
some positive discretion in the separating power case decreases. Thus, when xA = r, a
necessary condition for discretion is xI ≤ r.
In the white area, labeled P , the ideal points are such that the interest group has a
larger negative impact in the parliamentary case than in the separation of power case. In
the shaded area, labeled S, we have the opposite eﬀect. To grasp the intuition behind
Proposition 2, we focus on some of the simpler cases: First, consider ideal points such that
xA = −αxI . In this case the lobby has indeed a positive eﬀect on the legislature’s welfare in
the separation of powers system, since it induces the bureaucrat to have a preferred outcome
identically to the legislature. On the other hand, in the parliamentary system, the lobby
always has a negative eﬀect on expected welfare, given the preference divergence between
the legislature and the interest group. Hence, in this case, it is clear that the impact on the
legislature’s welfare is more negative in the parliamentary case. In general, when an interest
group has a opposite interest than the administration from the legislature’s perspective,
then we always observe a more negative eﬀect on legislature’s welfare in the parliamentary
system: From the perspective of the legislature the opposing interests of administration
and lobby group oﬀset each other and that the legislature expands the delegation in the
separation of power case.
Second, to see the intuition in the white area to the right in Figure 2, consider ideal points
on the xA = xI locus. In the separation of power case, there will be no impact on the induced
preferences through lobbying, as the administration’s and the interest group’s preferences
are identical. Hence lobbying does not aﬀect expected welfare. In the parliamentary system
without lobbying we are in the best possible case for the legislature, as there is no preference
divergence between the legislature and the bureaucrat. Only the introduction of a lobby
creates a preference conﬂict, thus reducing the legislature’s expected utility. Hence, in this
case the lobby again has a more negative impact on expected welfare in the parliamentary
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case. By continuity, this holds for ranges of ideal points close to the xA = xI line as well.
Third, consider ideal points that lie inside the shaded area labeled S in the right part
of Figure 2. Recall that EUL contains quadratic terms and that therefore a given shift of
ideal point away from the legislature’s has a larger impact on utility the further the ideal
points are from xL. In the shaded area we have xI > xA, xA small. Thus, the lobby
induces a bureaucratic ideal point xˆ > xB in both institutional regimes, and, since xA > 0
but small, the induced movement is smaller in the separation of power system than in the
parliamentary system, but occurs further away from xL. The quadratic loss function then
explains that the interest group’s reduction in expected utility is greater in the separation
of power system for this range of ideal points.
We conclude that for most ideal point constellations bureaucratic lobbying has a less
detrimental eﬀect in the separation of powers system than in the parliamentary system.
The following proposition shows the eﬀect of an increase in ex ante uncertainty, r, on
the impact of lobbying across legislative systems.
Proposition 3. Assume that the legislature has a (weak) incentive to delegate in each sys-
tem of government, both with and without lobbying.
1. The interest group’s (negative) impact on the legislature’s welfare increases in the ex
ante uncertainty in the parliamentary system.
2. The interest group’s impact on the legislature’s welfare decreases in the ex ante un-
certainty in the separation of powers system iﬀ xI ∈ [−(2+αα )xA, xA].
3. The marginal eﬀect on the interest group’s impact on the legislature’s welfare from an
increase in uncertainty is larger in the parliamentary system than in the separation of
power system iﬀ |xˆp|3 + xA3 ≥ |xˆs|3.
An increase in uncertainty, as measured by r, increases the (detrimental) eﬀect of lob-
bying on the legislature’s welfare in the parliamentary system. In the separation of powers
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system, increased uncertainty enhances the positive eﬀect of lobbying in the range where
bureaucratic lobbying mitigates the conﬂict between the legislature and the administration.
The condition in Proposition 3(2.) is the same as condition A in Proposition 1.
5.3 Impact on Policy Outcomes
We deﬁne the relative impact of a lobby group on expected outcome across the two legislative
systems as ∆LIOps = |LIOp| − |LIOs|. A positive value of ∆LIOps means that the lobby
group has a larger eﬀect on expected outcome in the parliamentary system than in the
separation of power system. Proposition 4 below characterizes the circumstances in which
the interest group inﬂuence on bureaucrats moves expected policy more in a parliamentary
legislative system than in a system with separation of powers, i.e., in which system an
interest group has a greater inﬂuence on expected policy outcomes.
Since ∆LIOps involves absolute values, its value depends on whether the change in
expected outcome from introducing lobbying is positive or negative in each of the systems.8
We shall keep in mind, however, that the absolute value is a continuous operator, which
assures that ∆LIOps is continuous throughout.
In the parliamentary system LIOp is positive (negative) if xI >(<) 0. In the separation
of powers system the following Lemma identiﬁes the regions in the range of ideal points for
which LIOs is positive (negative).
Lemma 2. In the separation of powers system lobbying moves the expected outcome to the
right (LIOs > 0) if and only if
either xI > xA and xI < 1+αα r − 2+αα xA (C)
or − 1αxA < xI < xA and xI > 1+αα r − 2+αα xA. (D)
Lemma 2 states that LIOs is positive if xI and xA fall into the regions delineated by
8∆LIOps = |LIOp| − |LIOs| and di = r − |xˆi|. We thus need to consider separately the cases for which
LIOs ≶ 0, LIOp ≶ 0, xˆs ≶ 0, and xˆp ≶ 0. For LIOs, this is done in Lemma 2. Furthermore, the sign of xˆp
is given by xI ≶ 0; and xˆs > 0 ⇔ xI > − 1αxA.
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Figure 3: Ideal points where lobbying moves expected policy right (left)
condition C or D. (Notice that on the boundary of C and D, where any of the inequalities
holds with equality, LIOs = 0.) These regions are illustrated in Figure 3. Again the bounds
of the ﬁgure are given by the assumption that the legislature always has a (weak) incentive
to delegate.
We already observed that the −α-sloped line through the origin delineate the points
where xˆs = 0. The line LL has a slope −2+αα and constitutes the boundary for the cases in
Lemma 2. It separates the areas where LIOs ≶ 0; hence, on line LL lobbying has no eﬀect
on expected policy outcomes in the separation of powers system. This, of course, does not
mean that lobbying has no eﬀect at all; lobbying still aﬀects the amount of delegation, the
legislature’s welfare, and the variance of policy outcomes, which highlights that these eﬀects
are not monotonically related. On LL the average outcome is not aﬀected by lobbying.
The intuition behind the area delineated by condition C—that is the bottom shaded
area in Figure 3—can simplest be provided by ﬁxing the administration’s preference at
some moderate level. Without lobbying this implies a positive level of delegation and an
expected outcome higher than the legislator’s preferred outcome. Consider an interest group
whose preferred outcome lies between the legislature’s and the administration’s preferred
outcomes. The impact of this lobby group is to moderate the impact of the administration
on the bureaucrat, which increases delegation and lowers expected outcome. Thus, the
presence of the lobby has a negative impact on expected outcome. Next, assume the lobby’s
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preferences are more extreme than the administration’s. Then the impact of the lobby
group is to increase the administration’s preferred outcome and through this to increase the
expected outcome. Finally, when the lobby becomes to extreme, the induced preferences
on the bureaucrat will be so far away from the legislature’s preferences that delegation
is decreased relative to the situation without a lobby. When the line LL is crossed the
reduction in delegation is so signiﬁcant that expected policy comes close to zero. In these
cases we have that the presence of the lobby group decreases expected outcome.
To grasp the intuition behind the area delineated by condition (D) we look at the case
where xI = 0, i.e., where the interest group has the same preferences as the legislature.
When there is little conﬂict between the legislature and the administration, that is in the
white area on the vertical axis, there is a positive amount of delegation in the absence of
lobbying and the bureaucrat generally picks an outcome that is higher than the one the
legislature would choose themselves if it were informed. Now the interest group moves the
bureaucrat’s induced ideal point towards the legislature’s most preferred outcome. There-
fore, in expectation, the lobby has a negative impact on the outcome in this case. If the
administration’s preferences become too extreme relative to the legislature, the legislature
limits the amount of delegation to the bureaucrat. In these cases, the impact of the lobby
group can moderate the preferences of the bureaucrat, such that delegation is increased
after lobbying. When delegation increases the expected outcome may increase, thus lobby-
ing moves expected outcome further away from the legislature—even though the lobby had
identical preferences to the legislature. This happens in area D of Figure 3, and the key
is that due to the moderating eﬀect of the interest group it is beneﬁcial for the legislature
to delegate more, which induces the expected policy to move further from xL, but has the
beneﬁt of reducing the variance of the outcome.
We now have a full set of conditions that allows us to state the relative impact of lobbying
on expected policy outcome in the two systems of government, given in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Assume that the legislature has a (weak) incentive to delegate in each sys-
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tem of government, both with and without lobbying. Then bureaucratic lobbying has a greater
impact on the expected policy outcome in the parliamentary system than in the separation
of powers system (∆LIOps > 0) under the following conditions:
1. suppose xI > 0,
(a) under C, always,
(b) under D, iﬀ xI ≥ 2+α2 xA − 1+α2 r,
(c) under ∼C and ∼D, iﬀ
(2 + α)xA2 − ((1 + α)r + 2xI)xA + 2((1 + α)r − αxI)xI ≥ 0;
2. suppose − 1αxA < xI < 0,
(a) under D, iﬀ (2 + α)xA2 − ((1 + α)r + 2αxI)xA + 2(1 + α)rxI ≤ 0,
(b) under ∼D, iﬀ (2 + α)xA2 − ((1 + α)r + 2xI)xA − 2αxI2 ≥ 0;
3. suppose xI < − 1αxA (i.e., B), iﬀ xI ≥ 1+α2 r − 2+2α+α
2
2α x
A.
If xI = 0, then lobbying always has a greater impact on the expected policy outcome in the
separation of powers system.
The condition for ∆LIOps ≶ 0 diﬀers across the regions identiﬁed above. The conditions
in 1(b) and 3 are linear, condition 2(a) is quadratic in xA, and 1(c) and 2(b) are quadratic in
both xA and xI, making them somewhat diﬃcult to compare. It is easy to verify, however,
that the conditions in 1(b),(c) and 2(a),(b) all meet at a point s where xI = 0, and those
in 2(b) and 3 meet at a point q where xI = − 1αxA, as the continuity of ∆LIOps requires.
Figure 4 then illustrates the result of Proposition 4 by depicting the ranges of ideal
points for which the impact of lobbying on expected outcomes is greater in the parliamen-
tary system (denoted by P) and those for which the impact is greater under the separation
of powers system (indicated by S). Again, the bounds for the ﬁgure are given by the propo-
sition’s premise that there is always a positive incentive to delegate.
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Figure 4: Regions where impact of lobbying on expected outcomes is greater in the parlia-
mentary (P) or the separation of powers (S) system
The intuition is not straight forward, since it combines the insight from Figure 3 with
the interest group’s eﬀect on the expected outcome in the parliamentary case. Hence we
only provide the intuition for the most simple areas in Figure 4.
First, from Figure 3 we have that line LL is characterized by preference combinations
where lobbying does not move expected outcome in the separation of power system. In
the parliamentary system, the expected outcome is moved whenever the lobby has diﬀerent
preferences than the legislature, conditional on there being strictly positive delegation after
lobbying. Hence we conclude, that the impact of a lobby group on expected outcome is
larger in the parliamentary system for all preference combinations along line LL except
when xI = 0, where there is zero impact in both systems. By continuity the lobby’s impact
in the separation of power system is relative small compared to the parliamentary system
in a neighborhood around LL. This provides the intuition for the two wide ares in Figure 4
where the impact of lobbying is relative larger under a parliamentary legislature.
Second, when xI = 0 the lobby has no impact on expected outcome in the parliamentary
case. For xA > 0 it will in general tend to moderate the preference divergence between the
legislature and the administration. As discussed before, this has a negative impact on
expected outcome for less extreme administrative preferences and a positive impact on
expected outcome for extreme preferences due to increased delegation. Hence, when the
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interest group has the same preferences as the legislature (except where LL crosses the
vertical axis) the lobby has a greater impact on expected outcome in the separation of
power system. Again by continuity, this will also be the case for preference combinations
where the interest group is close to the legislature. This provides the intuition for the two
dark areas in Figure 4 where the impact of lobbying is relative larger under a separation of
power system.
Third, for extreme values of xI an interesting eﬀect happens. In such circumstances,
there is little impact on expected outcome in the parliamentary case because the legislature’s
reaction to the presence of a lobby is to remove almost all the discretion from the bureaucrat.
On the other hand, in the absent of lobbying under the separation of power system there
will be some delegation given the administration is not too extreme. The lobby group
induces more extreme preferences on the bureaucrat and accordingly the legislature removes
discretion. Therefore, there will be a signiﬁcant negative impact on expected policy implying
that the lobby in these cases have greater impact on expected outcome in the separation of
power case. This explains why there is a dark area to the right in Figure 4.
The striking feature of Proposition 4, illustrated in Figure 4, is how non-monotonic
the eﬀect of lobbying on expected policy is across the two systems of government. If the
interest group’s ideal point is relatively similar (on the same side and not too diﬀerent
in size) to the administration’s, then lobbying has a greater eﬀect in the parliamentary
system. If, however, the interest group is on the opposite side of the administration, the
counterbalancing eﬀect of lobbying in the separation of powers system and the distorting
eﬀect in the Parliamentary system may each dominate.
It is interesting to know what eﬀect a change in the ex ante uncertainty (as measured by
r) has on the magnitude of lobby group’s inﬂuence. This is characterized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. Assume that the legislature has a (weak) incentive to delegate in each sys-
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tem of government, both with and without lobbying.
1. In the parliamentary system the interest group’s impact on the expected outcome is
increasing in the level of uncertainty.
2. In the separation of power system, the interest group’s impact on the expected outcome
is increasing in the level of uncertainty iﬀ
xI ≤ 1 + α
α
r − 2 + α
α
xA.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is straightforward in the parliamentary case, since
any preference divergence between the interest group and the legislature moves the ex-
pected outcome. Given the level of ex ante uncertainty (r) and the induced preferences
on the bureaucrat (xˆp) the optimal amount of delegation trades oﬀ an expected bias in
outcome against a reduced variance on this outcome. Now if uncertainty increases and
the delegation is not changed, the expected bias in policy is unchanged but the variance is
increased implying that it is optimal to increase the amount of delegation. Since delegation
is increased, the expected policy bias increases, which is what the ﬁrst part of Proposition
5 states.
In the separation of power case the intuition is more involved. Notice that the condition
in part 2 of Proposition 5 is identical to the LL-line in Figure 4, which provides us with
the key for the intuition behind the result. First, consider ideal points in the shaded
area below LL in Figure 4. In this case we know that the lobby has a positive impact
on expected outcome and the intuition behind the uncertainty result is exactly the same
as in the parliamentary case: An increase in uncertainty increases delegation and thus
increases the impact of the more extreme lobby group. Second, in the white area below
LL, the lobby group provides an moderating impact on the bureaucrat’s preferences and
thus have a negative impact on expected policy. Assume that the legislature has chosen
an optimal delegation level given the preferences of the lobby and the bureaucrat in this
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case and consider an increase in uncertainty. Now for an unchanged delegation level, the
expected policy bias is constant but the variance has increased; hence, it is optimal to
increase delegation. The increased delegation provides a stronger expected outcome bias in
the absence of the lobby. The Proposition shows us that the moderating eﬀect of the lobby,
therefore, increases, which results in that the lobby’s impact on expected outcome becomes
larger.
Third, assume that xA = r and that xI < xA, i.e. that we are in the shaded area above
LL. Without lobbying the legislature leaves zero discretion to the bureaucrat implying that
lobbying has a positive impact on expected policy even though it moderates the induces less
extreme preferences on the bureaucrat. Now assume uncertainty increases; in the absence
of lobbying the legislature optimally chooses a strictly positive amount of delegation that
introduces an expected outcome bias. Similarly, in the presence of lobbying delegation
is increased implying that the expected outcome bias increases. The Proposition tells us
that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second, implying that the lobby has lower eﬀect on
expected outcome when uncertainty increases. The intuition is similar for less extreme
administrations in this area of Figure 4.
Finally, to grasp the intuition in the white area above LL, assume that preferences are
given such that we are on a point on the dashed border line to the right in Figure 4. In
this case there is positive delegation without lobbying and zero delegation with lobbying,
implying that lobbying has a negative impact on expected outcome. Now, when uncertainty
increases it increase the amount of delegation both with and without lobbying implying
that the expected outcome bias increases. Again the result is that the change in expected
outcome without delegation is largest without lobbying implying that the lobby’s impact
on expected outcome decreases in the level of uncertainty.
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6 Discussion
In this paper we provided a framework for studying the inﬂuence of interest group lobbying
on the bureaucratic policymaking and its consequences for optimal statutory design. In
the presence of bureaucratic lobbying, the legislature needs to anticipate the inﬂuence of
interest groups on agency decision-making and choose the degree of delegation to the agency
accordingly. We showed that the optimal design of statutes diﬀers across diﬀerent political
institutions.
The model shows that bureaucratic lobbying in the parliamentary system reduces the
optimal degree of delegation, while in the separation-of-powers system the eﬀect depends
on the speciﬁc location of the interest group(s). The paper conducts no welfare analysis
of interest group inﬂuence, since preferences of the legislature and of interest groups are
a reduced form of broader societal preferences. To the extent legislative preferences are
aligned with social welfare, the change in the legislature’s payoﬀ can serve as a proxy for
welfare. We would be cautious, though, in making this inference.
The simple institutional diﬀerences considered in this paper assume that in a parlia-
mentary system preferences of the bureaucracy more closely reﬂect those of the governing
coalition, whereas in the separation-of-powers system preferences of the bureaucracy are
aligned with those of the administration. This may particularly be the case if high-level
bureaucratic appointments reﬂect the ideological precommitments of a newly elected ad-
ministration. One might argue that the administration can choose the top bureaucrats
more strategically so as to move policy outcomes closer to its most preferred outcome.
However, since the legislature in the separation of powers system generally needs to con-
ﬁrm bureaucratic appointees, the nomination process becomes a bargaining game that is
beyond the scope of his paper. The analysis could be fruitfully extended to cover strategic
appointments.
The model suggests non-linear relationships between ideology and inﬂuence of interest
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groups on the one hand and policy outcomes on the other. This observation should be
informative for empirical studies of interest group inﬂuence. E.g., simply observing that
policy does not change on average in the presence of interest groups would, in light of our
model, not allow the conclusion that interest groups are without inﬂuence.
In the present model interest groups can lobby the bureaucracy only. We think of this
as a subgame of a complete lobbying game in which interest groups face a choice of venue,
i.e., whether (and how much) to lobby the legislature and the bureaucracy. This paper thus
provides a necessary intermediary step in developing such a complete game of the policy
process.
The framework and analysis presented in this paper might also be useful to study dele-
gation to committees in the legislature (Krehbiel 1992) on the one hand and to bureaucratic
experts on the other. The choice is then for the legislature to delegate to a bureaucrat with
preferences similar to the administration or to delegate to a committee whose preferences
may diﬀer from the the legislature’s more or less than the bureaucrat. Since lobbying con-
gressional committees and bureaucratic agencies may be diﬀerentially eﬀective, interesting
(and non-monotonic) comparative statics may be the product or such analysis.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We solve the game using backward induction. At date 3, having observed ω, the
bureaucrat chooses p so as to maximize her utility from x subject to the legislative constraint
(q, d) and the incentives t(·) oﬀered by the interest group. If the maximum is not unique,
we break indiﬀerence by letting x be the maximal element closest to xI .
Given the bureaucrat’s best response the interest group chooses t(·) and x so as to
maximize its utility
max
x,t(·)
U I(x, t) = −(x− xI)2 − αIt(x)
s.t. − (x− xB)2 + αBt(x) ≥ −(x◦ − xB)2 (PC)
−(x− xB)2 + αBt(x) ≥ −(x′ − xB)2 + αBt(x′)
∀x′ : x′ − ω ∈ [q ± d] (IC)
|x− ω − q| ≤ d, (D)
t(·) ≥ 0. (N)
where x◦ is the policy outcome the bureaucrat optimally chooses if she rejects the inter-
est group’s oﬀer; hence, (PC) is the bureaucrat’s participation constraint. Since without
incentives the bureaucrat chooses p ∈ D such that p + ω is closest to xB, we have
x◦ =

xB if ω ∈ [(xB − q)± d]
q + d + ω if ω < (xB − q)− d
q − d + ω if ω > (xB − q) + d.
The (IC) constraint assures that for all feasible x′ = x the bureaucrat is not better oﬀ
and thus chooses x as intended by the interest group. Since x◦ maximizes the bureaucrat’s
utility of a policy choice in D, for any transfer t(x) satisfying (PC) there always exists a
non-negative schedule t(x′) satisfying (IC) and (N) for all x′ − ω ∈ D. Thus, the group’s
optimal transfer at x is to let (PC) be binding, or
t(x) = 1
αB
((x− xB)2 − (x◦ − xB)2). (3)
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Substituting (3) into the objective function, the interest group’s problem reduces to
max
x
−(x− xI)2 − α(x− xB)2 + 1
αB
(x◦ − xB)2, (4)
subject to (D).
The last term in (4) is a constant, thus it does not aﬀect the solution. (D), of course, is
the legislative constraint, requiring that p ∈ D.
Suppose ﬁrst that (D) is not binding. The FOC then yields the unconstrained maximum
for (4) at
x∗ =
xB + αxI
1 + α
≡ xˆ. (5)
Checking (D), the constraint is not binding for (xˆ − q) − d ≤ ω ≤ (xˆ − q) + d, which is
non-empty iﬀ |xˆ − q| ≤ d + r. If (D) is binding, then the boundary of (D) implies the
solution
x∗ =
{
q + d + ω if ω < xˆ− q − d
q − d + ω if ω > xˆ− q + d. (6)
At date 1 the legislature chooses q and d so as to maximize its expected utility, given
the bureaucrat’s implementation under lobbying. Given the policy outcomes in (5) and (6),
the legislature’s expected utility is given by
EUL = − 1
2r
∫ xˆ−q−d
−r
(q + d + ω − xL)2dω − 1
2r
∫ xˆ−q+d
xˆ−q−d
(xˆ− xL)2dω
− 1
2r
∫ r
xˆ−q+d
(q − d + ω − xL)2dω
= − 1
6r
[
(q + d + ω − xL)3]xˆ−q−d−r − 12r [(xˆ− xL)2ω]xˆ−q+dxˆ−q−d
− 1
6r
[
(q − d + ω − xL)3]r
xˆ−q+d
= −1
r
[
1
3(r − d)3 + (q − xL)2(r − d) + (xˆ− xL)2d
]
,
where we applied the rule (x + y)3 + (x− y)3 = 2x3 + 6xy2. Maximizing EUL w.r.t. q and
d, subject to d ≥ 0, gives the following ﬁrst order conditions
−2
r
(q − xL)(r − d) = 0
1
r
[(r − d)2 + (q − xL)2 − (xˆ− xL)2] = 0
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The ﬁrst equation implies that q = xL and the second implies that d = r−|xˆ−xL|, provided
that the latter is positive (d = 0 otherwise). Given q and d, the bounds on ω follow from
the constraint |(xˆ− ω)− q| ≤ d.
A.2 Proof Proposition 1
Proof. Parts 1 and 2 follow from the text.
Part 3. According to Lemma 1, L delegates more in the separation of powers system
than in the parliamentary system if |xˆs| < |xˆp| (∗).
Recall that xˆi =
xBi +αx
I
1+α , i = c, p. Since x
B
p = 0 and x
B
s = x
A > 0, we have xˆp =
αxI
1+α <
xA+αxI
1+α = xˆs. Thus, if xˆs ≤ 0, (∗) follows. If xˆs > 0, (∗) requires xˆs < −xˆp ⇔
xI < − 12αxA.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Assume xI < 0. If xA + αxI ≥ 0, then the lobby group has a positive (negative)
impact on the legislature’s utility in the separation of power (parliamentary) system. If
xA +αxI < 0, then it may have a negative impact in both systems. However, since xA > 0,
then 0 > xˆs > xˆp ⇔ W s > W p . Since Wns < Wnp = 0, we have shown that the proposition
is true for xI < 0. Next, assume xI ≥ 0. Then,
∆LIWps = −xˆ2p(1−
2
3r
xˆp)− (−xˆ2s(1−
2
3r
xˆs)− (−xA2(1− 23rx
A)))
= (
2αxIxA
1 + α
)2 − 2
3r
3α2xI
2
xA + 3αxIxA
2
(1 + α)3
− (α + 2)α
(1 + α)2
xA
2
∆LIWps ≥ 0 ⇔
2αxAxI
(1 + α)2
− 2
3r
3αxIxA
2
+ 3α2xI
2
xA
(1 + α)3
− (α + 2)α
(1 + α)2
xA
2 ≥ 0 ⇔
r(1 + α)xI − αxI2
xI + r(1 + α)(α/2 + 1)
≥ xA.
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A.4 Proof Proposition 3
Proof. Part 1, Since the lobby group has a negative impact on utility, we measure the eﬀect
of increased uncertainty as −∂LIWp∂r . From the text we know that −LIWp = xˆ2p(1− 23r |xˆp|)
which is positive given the condition that discretion is weakly positive. Furthermore, it
increases in r.
Part 2, Similarly to above we have LIWs = −xˆ2s(1− 23r |xˆs|)− (−xA
2
(1− 23rxA)) and,
−∂LIWs
∂r
=
1
r2
2
3
(|xˆs|3 − xA3).
Thus the impact of r on −LIWs is increasing iﬀ |xˆs| = |xA+αxI1+α | > xA. If xI ≥ 0,
then the condition reduces to xI > xA. If −xA 1α < xI < 0, then the condition is never
satisﬁed. Finally, if xI < −xA 1α , then the condition becomes −xA − αxI > (1 + α)xA ⇔
xI < −( 2α + 1)xA.
Part 3. We want to determine the sign of ∂∆LIWps∂r . From above we have:
∂∆LIWps
∂r
= −∂LIWp
∂r
+
∂LIWs
∂r
=
1
r2
2
3
(|xˆp|3 − |xˆs|3 + xA3)
This is positive iﬀ |xˆp|3 + xA3 ≥ |xˆs|3.
A.5 Proof Lemma 2
Proof. Recall that LIOs =
ds
r xˆs − d
n
s
r x
A and d ≥ 0, xA > 0. Thus, xˆs ≤ 0 ⇒ LIOs ≤ 0.
Hence, assume xs > 0 ⇔ xI > − 1αxA. Then
ds
r
xˆs − d
n
s
r
xA > 0 ⇔
(r − x
A + αxI
1 + α
)
xA + αxI
1 + α
− (r − xA)xA > 0 ⇔
rα
1 + α
(xI − xA)− x
A2 + α2xI
2
+ 2αxAxI
(1 + α)2
+
1 + α2 + 2α
(1 + α)2
xA
2
> 0 ⇔
rα
1 + α
(xI − xA)− α
2(xI − xA)(xI + xA) + 2αxA(xI − xA)
(1 + α)2
> 0
Case xI > xA: r(1 + α)− αxI − (2 + α)xA > 0 ⇔
r(1 + α)− (2 + α)xA > αxI
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Case xI < xA: r(1 + α)− αxI − (2 + α)xA < 0 ⇔
r(1 + α)− (2 + α)xA < αxI .
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Cases 1(a) and (b). Since C or D holds and xI > 0, we have, by Lemma 2,
LIOs > 0, LIOp > 0. Further, for i = p, s we have xˆi > 0 and hence di = r − xˆi and
dni = r − xBi . Thus,
∆LIOps = LIOp − LIOs =
dp
r
xˆp − (d

s
r
xˆs − d
n
s
r
xA) ≥ 0 ⇔
r − αxI1+α
r
αxI
1 + α
− r −
xA+αxI
1+α
r
xA + αxI
1 + α
+
r − xA
r
xA ≥ 0 ⇔
α
1 + α
xA − 1
r
α(α + 2)
(1 + α)2
xA
2
+
1
r
2αxIxA
(1 + α)2
≥ 0 ⇔
rα(1 + α)− (α2 + 2α)xA + 2αxI ≥ 0 ⇔
−1 + α
2
r +
2 + α
2
xA ≤ xI (7)
Furthermore, in case 1(a), condition C requires xI > xA. Now suppose eqn. (7) is violated.
Then xA < xI ≤ 2+α2 xA − 1+α2 r ⇒ r < xA, which contradicts the premise that xA ≤ r.
Thus, ∆LIOps ≥ 0 must always hold in case 1(a).
Case 1(c). ∼C and ∼D implies LIOs < 0 by Lemma 2, and xI > 0 implies LIOp > 0 and
xˆ, xˆ > 0. Thus,
∆LIOps =
dp
r
xˆp −
∣∣∣∣dsr xˆs − dnsr xA
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0 ⇔
r − αxI1+α
r
αxI
1 + α
+
r − xA+αxI1+α
r
xA + αxI
1 + α
− r − x
A
r
xA ≥ 0 ⇔
2αxI
1 + α
− 2α
2xI
2
r(1 + α)2
− αx
A
1 + α
+
1
r
α(α + 2)xA
2
(1 + α)2
− 2αx
IxA
r(1 + α)2
≥ 0 ⇔
(1 + α/2)xA
2 − r
2
(1 + α)xA − (xA + αxI − (1 + α)r)xI ≥ 0.
Case 2(a). Suppose xI < 0 and D. B implies LIOs > 0 and xˆs > 0, and xI < 0 implies
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LIOp < 0 and xˆp < 0. Thus, dp = r + xˆp, d

s = r − xˆs for i = p, s.
∆LIOpc = −
dp
r
xˆp − (d

s
r
xˆs − d
n
s
r
xA) ≥ 0 ⇔
−r +
αxI
1+α
r
αxI
1 + α
− r −
xA+αxI
1+α
r
xA + αxI
1 + α
+
r − xA
r
xA ≥ 0 ⇔
−r αxI1+α − α
2xI
2
(1+α)2
− rxA+rαxI1+α + x
A2+α2xI
2
+2αxIxA
(1+α)2
+ rxA − xA2 ≥ 0 ⇔
−2r αx
I
1 + α
+
αrxA
1 + α
+
xA
2
+ 2αxIxA
(1 + α)2
− (1 + α
2 + 2α)
(1 + α)2
xA
2 ≥ 0 ⇔
−2rαxI(1 + α) + αrxA(1 + α) + 2αxIxA − (α + 2)αxA2 ≥ 0 ⇔
2xI(αxA − r(1 + α)) + r(1 + α)xA − (α + 2)xA2 ≥ 0
Case 2(b). Suppose − 1αxA < xI < 0 and ∼D. ∼D implies LIOs < 0; xI > − 1αxA implies
xˆs > 0; and xI < 0 implies LIOp < 0 and xˆp < 0. Thus, dp = r + xˆp, d

s = r − xˆs.
∆LIOps = −
dp
r
xˆp +
ds
r
xˆs − d
n
s
r
xAs ≥ 0 ⇔
−r +
αxI
1+α
r
αxI
1 + α
+
r − xA+αxI1+α
r
xA + αxI
1 + α
− r − x
A
r
xA ≥ 0 ⇔
−r αxI1+α − α
2xI
2
(1+α)2
+ r x
A+αxI
1+α − x
A2+α2xI
2
+2αxIxA
(1+α)2
− rxA + xA2 ≥ 0 ⇔
− 2α
2xI
2
(1 + α)2
+
rxA
1 + α
− x
A2 + 2αxIxA
(1 + α)2
− rxA + xA2 ≥ 0 ⇔
−2α2xI2 − αrxA(1 + α)− 2αxIxA + (α + 2)αxA2 ≥ 0 ⇔
−2αxI2 − rxA(1 + α)− 2xIxA + (α + 2)xA2 ≥ 0
Case 3. Suppose xI ≤ − 1αxA (condition B). Then LIOi < 0 and xˆi < 0 for i = p, s. Thus
di = r + xˆi, for i = p, s.
∆LIOpc = −
dp
r
xˆp +
ds
r
xˆs − d
n
s
r
xBs ≥ 0
−r +
αxI
1+α
r
αxI
1 + α
+
r + x
A+αxI
1+α
r
xA + αxI
1 + α
− xA + 1
r
xA
2 ≥ 0 ⇔
−αxA
1 + α
+
2αxAxI
r(1 + α)2
+
(2 + 2α + α2)xA
2
r(1 + α)2
≥ 0 ⇔
xI ≥ r
2
(1 + α)− (1/α + 1 + α/2)xA.
The ﬁnal part of the proposition follows from the fact that xI = 0 implies LIOp = 0 and
|LIOs| > 0.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Part 1. The lobby group’s impact on outcome in the parliamentary system is:
|LIOp| = |
dLp
r
xˆp| = α|x
I |
1 + α
− 1
r
(αxI)2
(1 + α)2
which is weakly positive and increasing in r.
Part 2. In the separation of power system, we have three separate cases. Case 1 :
Assume C or D holds. ⇒ LIOs > 0 and xˆs > 0.
|LIOs| = d
L
s
r
xˆs − d
A
s
r
xAc =
r − xA+αxI1+α
r
xA + αxI
1 + α
− r − x
A
r
xA
=
xA + αxI
1 + α
− xA − 1
r
((
xA + αxI
1 + α
)2 − xA2)
which is increasing in r iﬀ x
A+αxI
1+α ≥ xA ⇔ xI ≥ xA.
Case 2 : Assume xˆs > 0 and ∼(C or D). Then LIOs < 0 and hence
|LIOs| = −d
L
s
r
xˆs +
dAs
r
xAc = −
r − xA+αxI1+α
r
xA + αxI
1 + α
+
r − xA
r
xA
= −x
A + αxI
1 + α
+ xA +
1
r
((
xA + αxI
1 + α
)2 − xA2)
which is increasing in r iﬀ |xA+αxI1+α | < xA. ⇔ xI < xA. Finally, (Case 3) assume xˆs < 0.
⇒ LIOs < 0. Hence
|LIOs| = −d
L
s
r
xˆs +
dAs
r
xAc = −(
r + x
A+αxI
1+α
r
xA + αxI
1 + α
− r − x
A
r
xA)
= −x
A + αxI
1 + α
− 1
r
xA
2
+ α2xI
2
+ 2αxIxA
(1 + α)2
+ xA − xA2 1
r
(8)
= −x
A + αxI
1 + α
+ xA − 1
r
((
xA + αxI
1 + α
)2 + xA
2
)
which is increasing in r.
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